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DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN STATE LABOR LEGISLATION
By FOWIER VINCENT HARPER*
I
Introduction
A NY regulation on the part of the state of the relations between
the laborer and his employer must necessarily deprive the one
or the other of his liberty or property, by interfering with his free-
dom to contract., The protection of freedom of contract which the
Constitution affords is not, however, an absolute right. There is
nothing necessarily unconstitutional about such legislation unless it
is "without due process of law." In other words, legislation of this
kind is usually a valid regulation if it can be justified as coming
within the due process of law provision.
Such legislation is often referred to as an exercise of the police
power, that broad principle of law-making so often employed to
*Professor of Law in the University of North Dakota.
"'Practically every change in the law governing the relation of employer
and employe must abridge in some respect, the liberty or property of one
of the parties-if liberty and property be measured by the standard of the
law theretofore prevailing. If such changes are made by acts of the legisla-
ture, we call the modification an exercise of the police power." Mr. Justice
Brandeis, dissenting, in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 355 (1921. Cf.
Learned Hand in "Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day," 21 Harv.
L. Rev. 495 (s9o8) : "It is also not of consequence that the 'liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment has come to mean the right to pursue one's
individual purposes as one likes and to make contracts for that end. There
can be little doubt that so to construe the term 'liberty' is entirely to disre-
gard the whole juristic history of the word."
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justify regulations calculated to promote the public weal and to pro-
tect public interests. That the States are empowered to enact laws
conducive to the public health, safety and morality is a proposition
indisputably established in our law. If labor legislation can be
fairly said to fall within the scope of the police power, it is there-
fore within the limitations prescribed by due process of law; if the
police power is incapable of including such legislation, it is likely
to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore void.
It is obvious that a consideration of labor legislation by the states
must include a consideration of the two fundamental conceptions
involved, the police power and "due process of law" as contained
in the Amendment. Within certain limits, the two conceptions are
opposed to each other. Both, however, are a living part of our
Constitutional law and both bear directly on labor legislation and
its validity. To study the basic theories upon which these concep-
tions are grounded and the habits of thought from which they
emanate, together with the decisions which are predicated upon
them, is the object of this inquiry; to review the general governing
principles as expressed in the particular applications of those prin-
ciples.
It has often been remarked that the police power is the vaguest
and least susceptible to definition of any of our legal principles. It
has likewise been frequently observed that due process of law is
incapable of exact definition. It has been suggested that the custom
of the courts and lawyers of thinking of a statute as being within
the police power when it fulfills the requirements of due process of
law, and being outside the limits of the police power when it fails
to satisfy the demands of due process, is, in truth, to get nowhere,
since by the time due process has been explained and delimited, one
had just as easily bounded the limits of the police power.2 It is
indeed true that the courts are profering little help when they refer
to the one conception to explain the other.
Since, then, it is impossible to adequately define either the police
power or due process of law, which means merely that it is impos-
sible to reduce either to a rule of thumb, the operation of which is
2See Albert Kales, "Due Process, The Inarticulate Major Premise and
the Adamson Act," 26 Yale L. I. 519, 520 (917).
DUE PROCESS IN" LABOR LEGISLATION
a purely mechanical process, the only hope of clarifying the police
power-due process problem lies in a critical examination of the
conditions under which these two conceptions are brought into op-
eration, and some analytical effort to detect, from the mass of de-
cisions, some of the essentials of due process, as the idea has evolved
in our Constitutional law. Through this means, it may not be im-
possible to formulate some rational and intelligible theory for
prophecy, for although definition be next to impossible, there may yet
be an understanding of the use of these conceptions.
The difficulty here is the same one which is invariably presented
when a legal precept cannot be expressed in that form of law which
we designate as a legal rule wherein all that is required is to de-
termine whether or not a given situation coincides with a given
series of operative facts. The general conclusion, the legal principle,
involves a different mental process for its application. The form3
is different. The difficulty is the one incurred in going from the
general to the particular. Rules, deduced from principles, when
firmly established in the law, are so much more convenient to mani-
pulate that there is a constant and manifest attempt on the part of
courts and lawyers to reduce every principle to a rule.4 The police
power, as a legal principle, has not infrequently been subjected to
this process.5 It is thus that the law loses its elasticity, and a prin-
ciple, originally broad and comprehensive, becomes narrow and in-
flexible. Stability is gained at the sacrifice of flexibility.
Still more difficult than the principle is the application of the
.legal standard, the universal conclusion. A standard is invaribly
involved in the operation of a legal principle. The standard pro-
vides the means of deriving the particular conclusion from the gen-
eral conclusion. In other words, in order to determine whether or
not a given statute is within the police power, it is necessary to apply
30n forms of law, generally, cf. Pound, "Theory of Judicial Decision,"
36 Har. L. Rev. 641, 645 (1923); Harper, "Forms of Law and Moral Con-
tent," 22 II. L. Rev. - (1927).
4The equitable maxim that Equity aids only the vigilant is handily turned
into a legal rule in the statute of limitations. Cf. the Roman law principle
that hard bargains were not enforcible giving way to the rule that considera-
tions less than one-half of the market value would not sustain a contract.
WFor example Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 67 L. Ed.
785, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923) ; see post. 40.
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a standard to determine the operation of that principle. Due process
of law supplies this standard, for the police power does not extend
to statutes which are not due process of law.
To understand the theories upon which both the police power
and due process of law are predicated is certainly indispensable in
the effort to realize that ideal harmony between the individual and
society which Constitutional law seeks to effect. Few can be en-
tirely satisfied with the treatment so often accorded these problems
by the courts. Regardless of one's atitude toward the result of the
decision, it can scarcely be denied that the method employed in
handling the minimum wage question in Adkins v. Children's Hos-
pital is unconvincing in principle inasmuch as the obvious attempt
is made to reduce the principle to a rule and determine the result
accordingly.
The legal profession in America has long been accustomed to
regard with skepticism any attempt to theorize over the existing
body of law. Jurisprudence, as a philosophy, has made little prog-
ress in the United States. Analysis and history, regarded more
kindly, have fared better. But with the steady and ever increasing
growth of the law in the attempt to keep pace with changing social
and economic conditions, it is evident that the legal rules of the past
must give way and must be broken down to be replaced by new
rules, deduced from broader legal principles, by the increasing ap-
plication of still broader legal standards. In this process sound
theory is the only safe guide, and juristic philosophy must supply
the theory. Some thirty years ago Mr. Justice Holmes observed,
"We are only at the beginning of a philosophical reaction and of a
reconsideration of the worth of doctrines which for the most part
still are taken for granted without any deliberate, conscious and
systematic questioning of their grounds."'
And so the attempt to look beyond the precedents to see what
has been the reason .therefore, the attempt to get at the bottom of
the whole matter, to see why and how the precedents have been
established must precede any constructive attempt to mould the law
6See James Nesbit, "Due Process of Law and Opinion," 26 Col. L. Rev.
23 (1925).
7"The Path of the Law," io Harv. L. Rev. 457, 468 (1897); Collected
Papers, 185 (192o).
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to satisfy the demands of modem life and society. "Back of the
precedents" writes judge Cardozo, "are basic juridical concepts
which are the postulates of legal reasoning, and farther back are the
habits of life, the institutions of society, in which these conceptions
had their origin and which by a process of interaction, they have
modified in turn."" The precedents are worth a great deal; in-
dispensable, as our law operates. Perhaps it is better, however, to
regard them as what the law has been, rather than what the law is.
At any rate it is necessary to have an eye upon more than the pre-
cedents alone and to try to master the conceptions themselves which
are the "postulates of juridical reasoning," and to do this in the
light of the "habits of life and institutions of society" at the time,
for these are the empirical conditions from which the precedents,
as the product of the law, have emanated. With this in mind, then,
a study of what seems to be the theories upon which the courts
have worked, in an effort to understand the principles which unify
and rationalize their judgments, should help to clarify the law, for
such are the principles which tend to extend themselves in a juris-
prudence.9
II
The Two Conflicting Conceptions.
Strictly speaking, the term "police power" of course includes all
the powers of government.10 Nothing is gained by calling it the
police power." It has rightly been called "unclassified legislative
power.' 2  Thus the Court in Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell com-
ments upon the broad nature of the power, saying:
"Police power is but another name for the power of government;
it is subject only to constitutional limitations which allow a compre-
sNature of the Judicial Process, x9 (1922).
Ibid. 31.
'OSee New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S.
65o, 661; 29 L. Ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. 252, (1885).
"'See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259, 271, 23 L. Ed.
543 (1875).
12Cf. Thayer, Legal Essays, 27 n. I (19o8).
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hensive range of judgment, and it is the province of the State to
adopt by its legislature such policy as it deems best."'1
Recognizing the broad scope of the power, lawyers and judges
have usually elected to regard it in a more restricted sense, for the
sake of convenience in analysis of what would otherwise be an
unwieldly problem. Thus we usually understand by the police power
that phase of governmental power generally employed in the in-
terest of the public health, safety, morals, convenience and general
welfare.1.4 No better understanding of this phase of the power of
government can be gained than that derived from the language of
Mr. justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York.",
"Both property and liberty are held on such reasonable condi-
tions as may be imposed by the governing power of the State in the
exercise of those powers ......
It is the power to impose such conditions that is commonly re-
ferred to as the "police power." Thus Mr. Chief justice Shaw, in
Commonwealth v. Alger,6 expresses it:
"Rights of property, like other social and convential rights, are
subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment, as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the gov-
erning and controlling power, vested in them by the Constitution,
may think necessary and expedient."
The police power is said to have originated in the functions
performed by the King in Council, which activities became of such
great importance after the reign of Edward IV. 7  Especially signi-
ficant was the control exercised by the privy council over vaccina-
tions and the prevention of disease.' s Consequently, it is contended,
after the Revolution in America, when the people of the States
inherited or acquired the powers of both the crown and Parliament,
the police power descended to the sovereign people, subsequently to
:22 U. S. 225, 56 L. Ed. 175, 32 Sup. Ct. 74 (911).
14 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 51 L. Ed. 499, 27 Sup. Ct. 289 (1907).
15'98 U. S. 45, 53, 49 L. Ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (195o).
167 Cush. (Mass.) 53, 85 (1851).
17See Taylor, Due Process of Law, 395 (0917).
38 lbid, 396. See also Taylor, Origin, and Growth of the English Con-
stitution, I, 252, and 546 (I889).
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become vested in their legislatures.'0 Such theories have been pro-
pounded by our courts.20  Tempting as this account for such a power
may be, it is more ingenious than significant. The police power, as,
in its restricted sense, a single phase of government, power, is so
intimately and essentially connected with the normal functions of a
sovereign state, that its origin must be said to inhere in sovereignty
rather than in any corresponding function of the English govern-
ment.21  This is usually regarded as a satisfactory explanation of
the power, and it is uniformly conceded to be subjected only to con-
stitutional limitations.
As a source of power, the exercise of which is regarded as suf-
ficient to authorize legislative interference with private right in the
interest of the public welfare, the police power is of comparatively
recent origin and growth in America. In England where no writ-
ten constitutional checks restrict its play, it has long been employed
to such ends, and to no small extent for the passage of labor legis-
lation.2 2  In the earlier cases which came before our courts there
was great reluctance to contribute to the growth of the conception. 3
Thus in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,'4 it was said that,
". ... no one can be called upon to surrender or sacrifice his
'
9lbid, 397.
20See Martin v. Waddell, I6 Pet. 367, 410, io L. Ed. 997 (1842).
21Cf. Crow, J. in State v. Somerville, 67 Wash. 638, 122 Pac. 324, 326
(1912): "The 'police power' * * * is an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
the exercise of which is necessary to secure good government and promote
the public welfare." See also Freund, Police Power, 2, 3 (19o4).
2"The first Statute of Laborers was enacted in 1349 involving a "max-
imum wage law." See 23 Edw. III, c. 3. See also Henderson, Historical
Documents of the Middle Ages, 165 (922). See also Reeves, History of
English Law, III, 365 (i88o). A long series of labor enactments followed:
34 Edw. III, c. 9 (136o) ; 2 Hen. VI, c. 18 (423) ; 3 Hen. VI. c. I (1425) ;
8 Hen. VI, c. 8 (1429) ; 23 Hen. VI. c. 12 (1444); II Hen. VII, c. 22 (1495) ;
12 Hen. VII, c. 3 (1496); 4 Hen. VIII, c. s (1512); 6 Hen. VIII, c. 3
(1514); 7Hen. VIII, c. 5 (515). See Learned Hand in 21 Harv. L. Rev.
495 (I9o8). See in general for early labor acts J. W. Bryan, The Develop-
inent of the English, Law of Conspiracy, 27 (19O9). See also Sayre, Cases on
Labor Law, Chap. I (1922).
23For the early growth of the police power, see Denny, "The Growth
and Development of the Police Power of the State," 2o Mich. L. Rev. 173
(1921).
242 Dal. 304, I L. Ed. 391 (795).
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whole property, real and personal, for the good of the community
without recovering compensation in value... The legislature, there-
fore, had no authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his
freehold, and vesting it in another, without just compensation ....
The next question is whether the legislature had authority to make
an act divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting it in another,
even with compensation."2 5
The courts and jurists of early America were thoroughly imbued
with natural law philosophy, and natural law, at that time, meant
the inviolability of individual rights, and especially property rights. 26
Federal supremacy, but with strong state governments, was to come
later. There was little room in the thoughts of either lawyers or
publicists for the growth of the police power. Professor Corwin
has traced the tardy evolution from the older insistence upon the
rigid protection of private interests to the point of recognition of
the state's right and power to impose reasonable restrictions upon
the enjoyment thereof, by reasonably legislating in behalf of the
public weal.2 7 The liquor traffic was one of the first of private in-
terests to succumb to governmental control, in the interest of the
public good,28 and it was but a short time until state courts began
to extend the principle of police regulation in this29 and other direc-
tions.2 0
The principle was conceded to be a valid one and received recog-
nition in our constitutional jurisprudence as a part thereof under the
influence of Chief Justice Taney.3" After 1837 the doctrine had
the recognition of the highest court in the land.2 That as early as
2 2Ibid. 310. Cf. also Osborne v. Huger, i Bay's Rep. (S. C.) 179 (I79I).
26
"The preservation of property, then, is a primary object of the social
compact * * *." Vanhorne v. Dorrance, supra. See Corwin, "Due Process
of Law before the Civil War," 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 375 (191).
27National Supremacy, chap. V (913).
28Byers v. Olney, i6 Ill. 35 (1854); King v. Jacksonville, 2 Scam. 305
(184o).
29See Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 IIl. 589 (1854).
3oWoodward v. Turnball, 3 Scam. I (841); see State v. Bosworth 13
Vt. 402 (1841) ; Presbyterian Churchyard v. New York, 5 Cowen 538 (1826) ;
Commonwealth v. Tewesbury, ii Met. (Mass.) 55 (846); Commonwealth
v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53 (185I).
31See Corwin, supra II6.
S-Miln v. New York, ii Pet. lO2, 9 L. Ed. 648 (837).
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1876, the police power was axiomatic in Constitutional law is sug-
gested by the language of Chief Justice Waite in Munn v. Illinois :3s
"'A body politic,' as aptly defined in the preamble of the Con-
stitution of Massachusetts 'is a social compact by which the whole
people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole
people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common
good.' This does not confer power upon the whole people to con-
trol rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. &
V. Ry. Co., 27 Vt. 143 (62 Am. Dec. 625); but it does authorize
the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct him-
self and so use his property, as not unnecessarily to injure another.
This is the very essence of government, and has found expression in
the maxim 'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.' From this source
come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice
Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583 (12 L. Ed. 256), 'are
nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty... that is to say ... the power to govern men and
things.' 34
Here, while the police power is recognized, there is still unde-
niable suggestion of the strict limits within which the courts were to
confine it for a quarter of a century. The old order was deeply
rooted, and was to yield only after a great struggle. In fifty years
the police power was to embrace the power to sterilize mental de-
fectives 5 and establish zoning ordinances,38 invasions of private
rights which were then unthought of under a free government. It was
about this time that legislatures began their work in the interests
of labor, and while the end is not yet reached, the path traveled
has been hard and long in the half century since. Every step of the
way has met with stubborn opposition. The Constitution, and
especially the Fourteenth Amendment, has been invoked to impede
3394 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
34Ibid. 124, 125.
35 See for example, Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 3O, 130 S. R. 516 (1925).
See also Shartel, "Sterilization of Mental Defectives," 24 Mich. L. Rev. I
(1925).
36 See, for example, Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84. 149 N. E. 784 (1925).
See also Baker, "Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances," 2o Ill. L. Rev.
213 (925).
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every advance. Just how this conception of due process has been
modified to permit the expansion of the police power in respect to
labor legislation is our particular problem. Let us, then, examine
briefly the nature of the conception due process of law in the effort
to understand the point of balance where the Constitutional scale
has, under changing conditions, come to rest.
The Fourteenth Amendment is uniformly regarded as insuring
the quality of reasonableness to exercises of the police power by
the States.. 7 But it is not easy to determine just what the test of
reasonableness may be for the entire history of the litigation in-
volving the two conceptions indicates the futility of attempting to
lay down a rule to cover every type of difficulty. In each situation
the problem arises afresh. 8  The cases differ in circumstances, and
the results vary. It is only by observing the trend of the line which
the law slowly marks out and by following closely the path which
it makes that the unifying principles can be gradually made manifest.
The origin of "due process" is usually thought of as being the
celebrated lex terrae clause of Magna Carla,39 and there can be little
doubt that this chapter sought to insure that particular phase of due
process, the want of which had been so largely responsible for the
ills of John's subjects. Surely, however, it did not mean any par-
ticular form of trial, nor did it necessarily involve a judgment by the
barons' peers in all cases.40 It has been pointed out that even a
great baron did not always regard a judgment by his peers as the
most obvious or natural way of making a charge.41
37Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561, 5o
L. Ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. 341 (io6).
38See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 1O4, 112, 55 L. Ed. 112,
31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
39John. 1215, c. 39. See McGhee, Due Process of Law, 3, n. i (1911)
for brief textual discussion of Magna Carta.
4OMcGhee, supra, 5, 6. Cf. Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law,
173, n. 3 (2nd. ed. 1899).
4'Powicke, "Per udicium parium vel per legem Terrae," Magna Carta
Commemoration Essays, 96, io3. Some courts of high repute have thought
that the lex terrae included trial by jury. See Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray
(Mass.) 329, 341-343 (1857). Prosecution by information, however, has
been held to be within the lex terrae in England. King v. Berchet, i Show.
i06 (i6go). With this compare Hurtado v. California, IiO U. S. 516, 534-
535, 28 L: Ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct. Iu (1884). Cf. the paraphrase of per legale
DUE PROCESS IN LABOR LEGISLATION
While it cannot longer be denied that lex terrae did not, as Coke
insisted, warrant every legal principle and every rule of procedure
that the common law might subsequently develop, and was thus not
synonomous with "due process of law," meaning "due process of
the common law,"'42 still it is difficult to conceive of the barons' no-
tion, namely that their liberty and property should not be taken ex-
cept by the established measures sanctioned by the law of the land,
being fundamentally or formally different from that which we enter-
tain when we speak of "due process of law." 43 The Cotirts have de-
clared that the Amendment provides for precisely such measures.
44
No doubt the barons' notion of what was included in the lex terrae
differs from that of today, but so also does the content of due process
vary from time to time. The conception, however, remains forever
the same.
The immediate abuse which it was the design of the barons to
remedy was unquestionably the so-called "Jeddart Justice. ' '45 This
was not the law of the land, and chapter 39 forbade it.48 Thus it
was that the lex terrae clause was an attempt to insure the safety
of the person'and his property from infringement, except, according
to Bigelow, by "judicial proceedings according to the nature of the
case,"4 7 and there was no question in Coke's mind but that per legent
terrae included the "Common Law, Statute Law, or Customs of
England.
14 s
Historical investigations have convinced us that the lex terrae
clause was designed, as McKecknie says, to protect the barons and
judicium pariunm suorumn vel per legent terrae, Reeves, History of English
Law, II, 43 (I88O). Cf. Mott, Due Process of Law, 34 (1926).
42See Corwin, "Due Process of Law before the Civil War," 24 Harv. L.
Rev. 366, 368 (i11). See also McKechnie, Magna Carta, 446 ff. (1o5)
McGhee, supra 5.
43"Itwas in fact a declaration in favour of legality all around." Vino-
gradoff, "Magna Carta Chapter 39," Comnziemoration Essays, 85. For differ-
ing interpretations by different scholars, see references in Mott, Due Process
of Law, 32, n. 9.
44Cf. Myers v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 39o, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 Sup. Ct. 577
(1923).
45
"Hanging first and judging after."
46McKecknie, Magna Carta, 381 (9o5).
47History of Procedure, 155 n. (I88O).
48IZstitutes, II, 46, 50.
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their friends against the King.49 Their sense of fairness and decency
had been outraged, because the familiar legal practices had been
neglected. It was to eliminate the arbitrary element in government
that they insisted upon compliance with the leax terrae. The pre-
vailing sense of justice demanded adherence to established modes of
procedure. At the basis of the conception, too, was the conviction
that popular justice was true justice. This was characteristic of the
common law, and must be taken into account in explaining the rise
of trial by jury,50 for although trial by jury was not unknown to
our Germanic ancestors, 1 its decay on the Continent" and its
growth in England can be satisfactorily accounted for in this way.
In considering the habits of thought and life of Englishmen and
Americans, then, there is nothing inconsistent in insisting that the
law of the land meant in 1213 fundamentally and formally what due
process of law means today,53 although to limit the scope of the
standard to this extent is to ignore the entire evolution of juridical
ideas.
John had relied largely upon the theory that the will of the
Prince was the law of the land.5" The barons thought otherwise.
But the lex terrae clause of the Charter was not a new idea. The
conception is too broad and too fundamental to have been ingeniously
49Supra 382.
5OSee Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 8 (1898. See also
Moschsisker, Trial by 1tury, sec. 27 (1922).
-iSee Forsyth, Trial by Jury, 16 ff. (Morgan's ed., 1875).
52See Pomeroy, Municipal Law, sec. 113 ff.
53In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., iS How. 272,
276, 15 L. Ed. 372, the Court, per Mr. Justice Curtis, said: "The words
'due process of law' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning
as the words 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Carta. Lord Coke, in his
commentary on those words (2 Inst. 5o) says they mean 'due process of law'
* * * We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be
in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to
those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and
statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which
are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political 'condition by
having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country." Thus the
prevailing sense of what is fair and just, in accordance with custom and
tradition, must be satisfied before either the law of the land is observed or due
process of law complied with.
5Taylor, Due Process of Law, 2.
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devised, on the moment, to meet the present evil. It was and had
been deeply rooted in English law.65 In fact it cannot be said to
be confined, in its fundamental sense, to English law. The Roman
law, says Sir Henry Maine, begins, as it ends, with a Code.r5  The
Twelve Tables were brought into existence in much the same way
as Magna Carta, for when the Plebes "struck," and assembled on
Rome's hills, there was a classic precedent for the assemblage of
the barons at Runnymede, many centuries later. On each occasion,
the complaint was that there had been a government of men and not
of laws, for when government, either through executive, legislative
or judicial action, offends the sense of fairness and justice,57 as de-
veloped by the customs and practices of the day, it has not acted
with due process of law nor has it been consistent with the law of the
land. Whenever this occurs, the notion of due process finds expres-
sion in a Code,58 a Magna Carta, or a Fourteenth Amendment.
55See Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, 150 (2nd. ed. I899),
the system of original writs. It seems that before the reign of Edward I,
the King of England could be sued as a common person. See Allen, Royal
Prerogative, 95, 96. Cf. Bracton I, 268 (Twiss' ed.) declaring that "the king
has a superior, for instance God. Likewise the Law through which he has
been made king. Likewise the Court * * *." After the Conquest, Stephen
was compelled, in the Oxford charter to promise to observe "the good laws
and ancient and just customs." See McKecknie, Magna Carta, Appendix,
483, 484. For charters antecedent to Magna Carta, see Stubbs, Select Char-
ters (i92i). With this, compare as to "due process of law," C. H. McIlwain,
in 14 Col. L. Rev. 27, 5, (1914); Professor Beale's comment on Union Re-
frigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (99 U. S. 194, 50 L. Ed. 150, 26 Sup. Ct.
36, i9o5) in 32 Harv. L. Rev. 587, 592 (919). Cf. also constructions of
"due process of law" in Otis Co. v. Ludlow Manufacturing Co. (201 U. S.
140, 50 L. Ed. 696, 26 Sup. Ct. 353, i9o6); Grant Timber Co. v. Gray (236
U. S. 133, 59 L. Ed. 501, 35 Sup. Ct. 279, 1915); Paterson v. Bark Eudora
(90 U. S. 169, 47 L. Ed. ioo2, 23 Sup. Ct. 82i, i9o3) ; St. Louis & S. F.
R. R. Co. v. Mathews (i65 U. S. x, 41 L. Ed. 6i, 17 Sup. Ct. 243, 1897).
GOAncient Law, 1 (3 ed. Am. ed.; 5th. London ed.).
57A state penal statute which prescribes no standard of conduct that it is
possible to know violates fundamental principles of justice embodied in the
conception of due process of law. Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 634, 638.
58 L. Ed. 1510, 34 Sup. Ct. 924 (1914). Cf. O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U. S.
244, 6o L. Ed. 249, 36 Sup. Ct. 54 (195).
5S"Among the chief advantages which the Twelve Tables and similar
codes conferred on the societies which obtained them was the protection which
they afforded against the frauds of the privileged oligarchy and also against
the spontaneous deprivation and debasement of the national institutions. The
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Nothing is truer in law than the proposition that mathematical
formulae are unsafe guides to the satisfactory solution of legal
problems. 9 Scholastic logic offers little assistance to a problem
involving two such theorems as "due process of law" and the "police
power." Under our theory of government sovereignty rests in the
people politically; not in the people as a collection of individuals. 0
We distinguish between the State and the government. 6' The latter
is the agency of the former, to carry out and execute its will. Con-
stitutional limitations, then, restrict the government but not the
State. 2  The Fourteenth Amendment, it follows, secures to the
people, individually, certain protections against the government."'
We regard the state as protecting its subjects by preserving,
through law, to certain extents, their interests; the law protects
interests by creating certain legal rights. 64 These rights are granted
by the law partly by statutes, partly by usage and custom as recog-
Roman Code was merely an enunciation in words of the existing customs of
the Roman people." Maine, Ancient Law, 17.
59Cf. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185, 41 L. Ed.
965, 17 Sup. Ct. 604 (1897) where it appears that the whole of the corpora-
tion's property was equal to more than the sum of its parts, at least so far as
taxation is concerned.
0The early Roman law proceded from the proposition that a rule of law
was such by virtue of the authority of the people to the conclusion that
statute law could be abrogated by desuetude, because that which the people
could do collectively, they could do by popular tacit agreement, though as
individuals. Constantine later denied this, logically enough, since, at the
time, law was such, not because it was the will of the people, but because
it was the will of the emperor. Our theory of the State, as a distinct legal
personality, disposes of the argument that what is done by the people, in their
political capacity can be abrogated by any, or all as individuals. Cf. Dernburg,
Pandekten, I, 22, -, translated in Pound's Readings in Roman Law, IO (914).6nSee Texas v. White, 7 Wall 700, ig L. Ed. 227 (1868) ; Virginia Coupon
Cases, 114 U. S. 270, 29o, 29 L. Ed. 185, 5 Sup. Ct. 903 (1884) ; Lehigh Valley
R. R. v. Russian Government, 293 Fed. 133 and 135 (1919).
62Cf. Willoughby, Fundanental Conceptions of Public Law, 82-83 (1924).
63
"The Constitution * * * is a restraint upon government, purposely pro-
vided and declared * * * making the restraints upon government the rights of
the governed." Mr. Justice McKenna in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 16o,
65 L. Ed. 865, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921). Cf. Stimpson, The American Con-
stitution as it Protects Private Rights, 6 and 210.
64 Jhering said that rights were legally protected interests. Geist des
roenischen Rechts, III, i, 351 (9o6). Cf. Salinond, Jurisprudence, 237 (7th.
ed., 1924).
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nized in the common law. But the Constitution, and the Fourteenth
Amendment do not create rights; they merely add guarantees that
rights already acquired shall not be violated by the government.65
In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to recog-
nize and protect fundamental rights long recognized under the com-
mon law system. 66 It was a means of securing the rights of the
minority against the rights of the majority.67 The phrase itself is
misleading. It certainly does not mean any definite method of pro-
cedure, the compliance with which will justify a taking of property
or a denial of liberty, which would otherwise be unlawful. 68  On
the other hand, the Amendment is recognition that sometimes the
interests of the individual conflicts with the interest of the public
or of society.69 Two things are provided by the Amendment: (i)
a guarantee of protection for the minority against the majority in
the expression "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property," and (2) a protection to the majority, or to
OsMinor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L. Ed. 627 (1874).
66Cf. Kelly v. Pittsburg, l04 U. S. 78, 8o, 26 L. Ed. 658 (i88i).
67Cf. J. S. Mill in "Utilitarian Basis of Individualism," Rational Bases
of Legal Institutions, 14, 15 (1923) : "The 'people' who exercise the power
are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and
the 'self government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself,
but of each by all the rest. The will of the people moreover, practically
means the will of the most numerous or most active part of the people; the
majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority;
the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number, and
precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of
power." Cf. Hall, Popular Government, 176, 177. Cf. also Jacobson v. Mass-
achusetts, 197 U. S. I, 38, 49 L. Ed. 643, 25 Sup. Ct. 358 (1905).
OsRogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 5o L. Ed. 256, 26 Sup. Ct. 87 (I9O5);
Garland v. Washington, 232 U. S. 642, 58 L. Ed. 772, 34 Sup. Ct. 456 (1914).
The early cases showed a decided tendency to treat the due process of law
clause as a restriction only upon procedural methods, but gradually the pro-
vision was extended, and application made as a restriction upon legislative
power in general. See Charles Warren, "The New Liberty under the Four-
teenth Amendment," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 441 (1926). See also E. S.
Corwin, "Due process of Law before the Civil War," 24 Har-. L. Rev. 366,
372 ff. (1911).
69Some writers deny that there exists such a thing as "social interests,"
all interests being, it is urged, but some form of individual interest. See,
for example, A. L. Corbin, "Jural Relations and Their Classification," 30
Yale L. 1. 226, 227, n. 2 (I92I).
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society, against the minority in the expression "without due process
of law." From this pledge by the State of protection to two kinds
of conflicting interests, comes the balancing process in each case,
the weighing of the one interest or interests against the other. It is
the saving clause "without due process of law," that permits the
operation of the police power in cases where the otherwise absolute
protection of life, liberty and property would preclude its application.
It follows that the due process of law clause is equivalent to a
declaration that individual interests shall not be compromised unless
the enjoyment of such interests materially infringes upon the inter-
ests of society. In the latter case, it shall be with due process of
law to deprive the individual to the extent of the conflict. It is not
an infringement of his rights, for he has no rights in the legal sense
under such circumstances. It is merely a recognition that, when
social interests materially suffer, the law affords no protection to
the conflicting private interests. To the extent that society sustains
injury, there are no legally protected private interests; likewise to
the extent that individual interests are materially invaded, society
has no legally protected interests. 70 If we substitute the word "all"
for "another," Constitutional law seeks for the "sum of the cir-
cumstances according to which the will of the one may be reconciled
to the will of 'another' according to a common rule of freedom."' 7'
This was Kant's definition of right (Recht), and with this revision
it represents indeed the "fixed point in the sense of an unattainable
and yet sure guiding star"72 of the law, for it contemplates justice,
or right, to the individual and right to society. So by superimpos-
ing upon Kant's conception a doctrine of "social interests," we
socialize it into a workable twentieth century philosophy.
Thus the two conceptions, each a check upon the other, strive
neither to produce exclusively public justice in the sense of exploit-
ing the minority through the individual, nor yet absolute individual
justice by exploiting the majority through society, by means of
7oCf. Mill's formula for liberty: "To individuality should belong the
part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society
the part which chiefly interests society." On Liberty, lO4 (Atlantic Monthly
Press ed., 1921).
71See Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgruende der Rechtslehre, Einldtung, B.
72Stannmler, Theory of Justice, io7 (925).
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exploded theories of natural law and inalienable rights of man.73
On the other hand, the net result of the balancing process must be a
gradual and reasonable invasion of each type of interests until the
people, both as individuals and as members of a growing and con-
stantly changing society, secure the greatest possible liberty accord-
ing to the "common rule of freedom."
In the weighing of public interests against private interests it
has been contended that the courts are, in fact, merely considering
individual interests, or groups of individual interests, all interests
being merely some form of private or individual interests.7 4  On
the other hand it is maintained that what we speak of as public or
social interests represent the only concern of the law.75 This premise
necessitates the conclusion that the law protects individuals only for
the sake of society, while the former proposition leads to the con-
clusion that the law protects society only for the sake of individuals.
Whether regarded from one point of view or the other, it remains
that the balancing process must take place, and interests, some of
which more widely affect the public, must be weighed against inter-
ests which, on the other hand, affect but a small proportion of so-
ciety. Law, as the exclusive guardian of the former, must assume
communistic tendencies; as the exclusive guardian of the latter, it
tends to support economic privilege. Most certainly the nineteenth
century stressed individual freedom at the expense of the masses, to
society's detriment. Law, with its object the protection only of
private interests and the satisfaction of private wants, 6 ignored
the demands of progressing society. Adjustment was bound to come,
73
"The right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it pro-
tected, is one of the natural, inherent and inalienable rights of man." Van-
horn v. Dorrance, 2 Dal. 304, 310, 12 L. Ed. 391 (1795). Cf. Richardson,
Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Oliver Wendell Hohnes, Introduction, 13
(1924): "He (Holmes) cannot believe in natural rights of man. In all
society, he says, duties and rights arise from practical necessity of forbear-
ance, if men are to live together and exist. But he finds no inherent right
which permits one man to live beside another. The fact that they do bear
and forbear is based upon utilitarian consideration." With this, compare
Holmes in 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 42 (ii8).
74See Corbin, ante, note 69.
75
"The interests of mankind cannot, like man's will, be opposed to those
of society." Korkunov, Theory of Law, 112 (199o). Cf. Pound, "Interests
of Personality," 28 Han'. L. Rev. 343, 349 (I915).
7GCf. Constitution of Washington, I, i.
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and, so far as labor legislation was concerned, the readjustment was
started a half century ago. Law must work out a solution involving
a reasonable protection for both types of interests. It can not be
seriously doubted that under ever changing conditions, as more
complex social and economic problems arise, resulting from the
progress of civilized society, more interdependence of the different
elements of which society is composed is inevitable, and increasing
public wants are apt to become, for the nonce, paramount to private
needs. Such is the price of civilization.
More and more the wide range of social interests makes new
demands upon the law, and the view that law is a social institution
calculated to satisfy social wants 7  may at times cause us to lose
sight of the interest that society must have in the protection of
private interests, for it is to the advantage of the majority to deal
fairly with minorities. 78  But we must not ignore the fact that by
translating private interests into social interests or by regarding the
latter in terms of the former, we are not changing the essential
nature of the problem.
Perhaps it is not too much to attribute largely the rise of the
social view of law to Jhering. His remarkable definition of a legal
right has been said *to be indicative of the complete change of at-
titude toward law.80 German jurists have not been slow to expand
this philosophy,"' nor have the French been tardy to recognize its
7 7See Poun, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 99 (1922): I am
content to think of law as a social institution to satisfy social wants * * *
the claims and demajnds involved in the existence of civilized society * * * by
giving effect to as much as we may with the least sacrifice, so far as such
wants may be satisfied or such claims given effect by an ordering of human
conduct through politically organized society."
78This has long been recognized. Cf. Bracton, De Legibus Angliae, I, 21.
(Twiss, 1878) : "Private right is that which pertains primarily to the interests
of individuals, and which pertains in a secondary manner to the State. Whence
it is said to be expedient for the State that no one should misuse his substance,
and so reciprocally, that it interests the State primarily, that it should in a
secondary manner regard the interest of individuals."79See ante. n. 64.
8OCf. Korkunov, supra, 112.
SlDernburg argues that a right is not conferred by law for the protection
of the individual alone, but to secure human needs. The interest involved
determines the legal use of a right. Pandektein, I, 34.
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significance. 2 In America, Constitutional law has conceded the value
of scientific data in estimating social interests in the triumph of the
sociological brief,8 3 although subsequent events have indicated that
only the beginning of the immediate problem here involved has as
yet been met.8 4 In private law as well, premises have been subjected
to a critical eye with a view to protecting the public in view of the
facts and conditions of society as they exist, not only in the problem
of handling actions for damages"' to person, but to property as well.sG
The courts have latterly recognized, in a general way, the nature
of the balancing process between public and private interests, al-
though not always the exact process of balancing. Mr. Justice
Harlan, in Adair v. United States,s7 speaking of liberty of contract,
said that it was "subject to the fundamental condition that no con-
tract whatever its subject matter can be sustained which the law
upon reasonable grounds forbids as inconsistent with the public in-
terests or hurtful to the public order, or as detrimental to the com-
mon good." Again, it was declared that the Fourteenth Amendment
debars States from striking clown personal liberty or property
rights or materially restricting their normal exercise excepting so
far as may be incidentally necessary for the accomplishment of some
other paramount object and one that concerns the public welfare. 8
s2See Planiol's discussion of an abusive or anti-social exercise of a right.
Traite Elementaire De Droit Cizil, II, 871 (4th ed.), translated in Pound's
Readings in Roman Law, 76 ff (1914).83For example Brandeis' brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 52
L. Ed. 551, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (198o).
84See post, 6o.85
"Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit
the conditions of travel today. The principle that the danger must be im-
minent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change.
They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them
to be." Cardoza, J. in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 1II
N.E. 1050, 1053 (i916).
sGFor example, the principle of "reasonable user" or "natural user" of
property. See Giles v. Walker, L. R. 24 Q. B. D. 656 (189o). See note in
Ames and Smith, Cases on Torts, 928 (Pound's ed., igip). See E. W. Huff-
cut, "Percolating Waters: The Rule of Reasonable User," 13 Yale L. 1. 222
(1904).
872o8 U. S. I6l, 52 L. Ed. 436, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908).
8SCoppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. I, 18-19, 59 L. Ed. 441, 35 Sup. Ct. 240
(1915).
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But it is not always easy to determine which way the balance
swings. Mr. Justice Holmes, voicing this difficulty, remarked in
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter :'9
"The boundary at which conflicting interests balance cannot be
determined by any general formulae in advance, but points in the
line of helping to establish it are fixed by decisions that this or that
concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side."
The public interests change so frequently and the line that fixes
the balance is so variable that only a few years intervening may be
sufficient to make that which was subordinate to private interest be-
fore, thereafter paramount to individual interest, and consequently
justly demand the further sacrifice of the latter to promote the public
welfare.
Again not all interests are protected by the law and different
interests are given varying degrees of protection. The circumstances
of each case must govern. The courts have taken different attitudes
toward the same interests at different times. Thus before 1898,
as is suggested later, it seemed that the social interest in morality
was sufficient to justify an infringement of private rights in many
instances where the social interest in the public health would not
so do. After Holden v. Hardy,9 and later, Muller v. Oregon,9 '
when the courts began to secure more information as to the effect
upon health of certain conditions to which workmen were subjected,
the scales turned in a manner detrimental to private interests, be-
cause of the greater recognized interest of the public in the health
of workmen. Today, with the decadence of Puritanism in addition,
the social interest in health and sanitation would probably be con-
ceeded vastly greater, so far as the invasion of private interests is
concerned, than the social interest in public morals. Whatever turn
the balance takes from time to time, the principle still remains that
private interests must be subjected in an ever increasing degree, to
the process of weighing against social interests, and, when outweigh-
ed, in the minds of reasonable men, must be proportionally sacri-
ficed; for the law, in order to live, must serve society.
89209 U. S. 349, 355-356, 52 L. Ed. 436, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (19o8).
90169 U. S. 366, 42 L. Ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 (1898).
91208 U. S. 412, 52 L. F-. 551, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (09o8).
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III.
a. Statutes Relating to Hours of Labor
The history of the judicial review of hours of labor statutes, in
general, begins approximately in 1876 when the Massachusetts court
sustained an act limiting the employment of women and children
under eighteen engaged in manufacturing establishments to sixty
hours a week.9 2 The court goes about its business cautiously and
does not face the issue squarely. The real conflict was evaded and
the act upheld on the theory that it did not, in terms, limit a woman's
right to labor as many hours per day or per week as she liked but
"merely prevented her employment continously in the same service
more than a certain number of hours."
The period from 1876 to 1898 was a barren one as to prog-
ress in upholding hours of labor statutes, enacted for the preserva-
tion of the health and welfare of the employes." Laws had been
adjudged constitutional, however, which restricted the hours of
labor of employes of laundries in large cities by prohibiting them
from working between the hours of ten P.M. and six A.M. and
prohibiting work on Sunday altogether. This result was reached
in the California court9 4 and in the Supreme Court of the United
States 5 and was predicated upon the power of the State and of
cities to guard against fires."9 The interest considered was the
public safety. The protection of the lives and health of laborers
was not involved. There was no indication, as yet, that the welfare
of a particular class of workers might be sufficient public interest
to justify interference by the State in the relations between them
and their employers.
2Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manufacturing Co., io Mass. 383 (1876).
931n 1881 an ordinance of San Francisco prohibiting women from being
employed in places where intoxicating liquors were sold was declared uncon-
stitutional, as being in excess of the police power. In re Maguire, 57 Cal.
604. A different result, however, was obtained sixteen years later. In re
Considine, 83 Fed. 157 (1897).
94Ex parte Moyner, 65 Cal. 33, 2 Pac. 728 (1884).
95Son Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. Ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. 730
(i885); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. Ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. 357
(1885).
9rBarbier v. Connolly, ibid. 30.
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On the other hand, throughout these years, the courts were al-
most unanimous in delivering themselves of the opinion that such
interest did not exist, in this respect, as to warrant so great an in-
terference with freedom of contract.9 7  In Lowe v. Reese Printing
Co., probably due, in part, to the fact that the statute might almost
be construed as a wage regulating act,98 the result was made to rest
upon a flat denial of the right on the part of the State to prohibit
more than eight hours of work. "The legislation attempted," said
the court, "cannot be defended as a police regulation, as was at-
tempted in argument, for, under pretense of the exercise of that
power, the legislature cannot prohibit harmless acts which do not
concern the health, safety, and welfare of society."99  By relying
largely on the Nebraska decision, the Illinois court reached a similar
result, the following year.100 The extreme individualistic philosophy
of the courts of these years was best indicated by the argument based
upon freedom of contract as an absolute right. Liberty included
the right to acquire property; labor was property; to acquire prop-
erty of this kind, contracts must be made and performed; therefore
the privilege of contracting was both a liberty and a property right.
"If one man," argues the court, "is denied the right to contract as
he has hitherto done under the law, and as others are still allowed
to do so by the law, he is deprived of both liberty and property to
the extent to which he is thus deprived."1 0I
The courts regarded liberty of contract as inviolable. No inter-
ference therewith could be "with due process of law." In addition,
the welfare of laborers was not a legitimate object of legislative con-
cern. The public could have no interest in them. The Supreme
Court, however, in 1898, threw the weight of its authority in the
other direction, and the first important step in upholding social legis-
97Wheeling Bridge and Terminal Co. v. Gilmore, 8 Ohio C. C. 658
(1894); Low v. Reese Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 59 N.W. 362 (1894); Re
Eight Hour Law, 21 Colo. 29, 39 Pac. 328 (1895); Ritchie v. People, 55
Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895).
9SThe act did not, in terms, prohibit labor for more than eight hours,
but provided that eight hours should be considered a day and further provided
for over-time pay for longer periods.
9959 N.W. 362, 368.
'
0ORitchie v. People, supra.
0l°Ibid. 105.
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lation was made.10 2 The Utah act in question was an eight hour
law for workers in underground mines. It was sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power. Health was the basis of the social
interest, and the health of laborers in mines was regarded as sufficient
justification for the exercise of the power, applying both to em-
ployers and employes alike.103  "These employments," declared the
Court, "when too long pursued, the legislature has judged to be de-
trimental to the health of the employes and so long as there are rea-
sonable grounds for believing this to be so, its decision upon this
subject cannot be reviewed by the Federal Courts."10'
In spite of the Federal decision on this subject, the Colorado
court, following its own precedent, 0 5 invalidated a statute similar
to the Utah act, insisting that the decision of the Supreme Court
was not binding on the States to establish the validity of such a
law under the State constitution. 0 "It would be absurd," reasoned
the court, "to argue that, while the process itself is continuous, limit-
ing the hours of those laboring in a smelter in any wise conduces
to preserve the health of any portion of the public. That is to say,
three shifts of laborers, working eight hours each, would affect the
public health to the same extent, if at all, as would two shifts at
twelve hours each . . . Indeed, the only object that can rationally
be claimed for it, is the preservation of the health of those working
in smelters ... How can an alleged law that purports to be the re-
sult of the exercise of the police power, be such in reality, when it
has for its only object not the preservation of the health of others
or of the public health, safety or morals or general welfare, but the
welfare of him whose act is prohibited when if committed, it will
injure him who committs it, and him only?"107 Subsequently, after
a constitutional amendment authorizing such laws, this same court
invalidated a similar act, upon a technicality of construction.108
lo2Holden v. Hardy, I69 U. S. 366, 42 L. Ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 (1898).
2O3See Short v. Mining Co., 20 Utah 20, 57 Pac. 72o (1899), holding that
the act applied alike to employer and employe, and that consequently an
employe who had worked overtime could not recover on a quantum vieruit.
O14Holden v. Hardy, supra.
lOSRe Eight Hour Law, supra.
lO6In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 58 Pac. 1071 (1899).
10758 Pac. iO75.
lOSlBurcher v. People, 41 Colo. 495, 93 Pac. 14 (1907).
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With this exception, however, Holden v. Hardy bore fruits.
Hours of labor statutes were generally approved by the courts 09
until the reactionary decision of the Supreme Court in 19o5 called
a temporary halt. The acts therefore had applied either exclusively
to women and children or to men engaged in patently dangerous
occupations. Lochner v. New York" 0 raised the constitutionality
of an act as applied to bakers. The Court was unable to see a rea-
sonable foundation for holding the law necessary or appropriate
as a health law to safeguard the health of bakers."'- The State
courts, however, had been invalidating these acts on the grounds
that to safeguard the health of a certain class of laborers was beyond
the scope of the police power and thus was not the legitimate object
of legislative solicitude. There were vigorous dissents to the Loch-
ner decision,"-2 the difference being in the application of the standard
of reason. Mr. Justice Peckham could see no reasonable relation
between hours of labor for bakers and either the public health or
that of the bakers, while the dissenting judges were unable to say
that there was no such reasonable relationship.
Some faltering was evidenced on the part of the State courts
after the Lochner decision"l3 until Muller v. Oregon was decided in
the Supreme Court three years later." 4 Technically, the Court
maintained its position in the Lochner case. General liberty to
contract "in regard to one's business and the sale of one's labor is
(still) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." But the act in
the Muller case was applicable to women only, and the Court found
the difference in sexes the margin of reasonableness by which the
case was distinguishable.from the Lochner case. The physical well-
'
0oCommonwealth v. Beattie, 15 Pa. Super. 5 (igoo) ; State v. Buchanan,
29 Wash. 6o2, 70 Pac. 52 (19o2); Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W.
421 (1902); Re Ten Hour Law for St. Ry. Corporations, 24 R. I. 6o3, 54
AtI. 602 (192) ;. State v. Cantwell, 179 Mo. 245, 78 S.W. 569 (1go3) ; Ex parte
Kair, 28 Nev. x27, 80 Pac. 463 (29o4); Re Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac. i
(1904).
120198 U. S. 45, 49 L. Ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
1"See the opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham, ibid. 61.
"12Particularly that of Mr. Justice Holmes, ibid. 74.
"'1In People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131, 81 N.E. 778 (1907); Burcher v.
People, supra.
1142o8 U. S. 412, 52 L. Ed. 551, 28 Sup. Ct, 324 (1908).
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being of mothers was of sufficient public interest to make the law
sound. The New York statute had applied to fathers, and was,
therefore, unreasonable.
Progress was now made steadily and year after year witnessed
decisions in the State courts favorable to labor. 15 Illinois enjoyed
a reversal by its court of the position taken in the earlier Ritchi
case,1 6 and California went so far as to enact a law limiting the
hours for the labor of women and children to eight hours per day
and forty-eight hours per week prohibiting their employment in
some work altogether, the same being upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.1 7  This was perhaps the most restrictive legislation
yet to come before the courts. But the old shibboleth of individual
freedom, without regard for social interests was being relegated to
obscurity. In some cases it was subjected to ridicule. The Missis-
sippi court, in a droll moment, paused to remark "the notable fact
that it is rare for the seller of labor to appeal to the courts for the
preservation of his inalienable rights to labor." "This inestimable
privilege," continued the court, per Cook, J., "is generally the object
"'1Ex parte Martin, 157 Cal. 51, io6 Pac. 235 (19o9) : An eight hour law
for women allowing time out for lunch. Whitney v. Bloom, 163 Mich. 419,
128 N.W. 913 (igo); a ten hour day, fifty-four hour week for women in
stores, warehouses, etc. Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N.E. 695 (191o) ;
a ten hour law for women in mechanical institutions, factories or laundries.
People v. Erie R. R. 198 N. Y. 369, 91 N.E. 849 (igio): An eight hour day
for trainmen and telegraph operators; reversed in Erie R. R. v. New York,
233 U. S. 671, 58 L. Ed. 1149, 34 Sup. Ct. 756 (1914), in so far as the act
attempted to regulate inter-state commerce, Congress having entirely covered
the field in the Hours of Service Act of 19o7. State v. Somerville, 67
Wash. 638, 122 Pac. 324 (1912): an eight hour law for women in mechanical
and mercantile establishments. State v. Newman Lumber Co., 103 Miss. 263,
6o So. 215 (1912); State v. Lumber Co., 102 Miss. 802, 59 So. 923 (1912) ;
People v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579, 98 N.E. 982 (1912); an eight hour law for
women in hotels. Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671, 58 L. Ed. 788,
34 Sup. Ct. 469 (913); regulation of hours for women and a requirement
for the posting of schedules in advance. People v. Kane, 79 Misc. 140, 139
N. Y. S. 350 (1913) ; a nine hour day, fifty-four hour week for women and
children in factories. But see State v. Barba, 132 La. 768, 6i So. 784 (1913).
16 Ritchie v. Waymen, supra.
"l'Bosley v. McLoughlin, 236 U. S. 385, 59 L. Ed. 632, 35 Sup. Ct. 345
(1914); Miller v. Wilson, ibid, 373.
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of the buyer's distinterested solicitude."' 118 Hours of labor laws
were, in general, constitutional, and courts refused to hold them
otherwise even though it appeared that in the particular instance,
labor for execessive hours did not produce injurious results, for
the statute must be considered, the courts declared, in "its general
application. ' ' 1 9
As yet, however, measures to come before the courts and to
receive their approbation were confined to restrictions upon the hours
of labor for women and children or for men engaged in "dangerous
occupations." In 1914 a general act, restricting hours for employes
in factories to ten hours per day came before the Oregon court
and was upheld.12  Two years later this decision was affirmed by
the Supreme Court'2' in spite of the argument that the act was, in
effect, a wage statute. 12 2 Although the Massachusetts court arrived
at a different result as to baggagemen,'12 3 the Oregon case has sub-
stantially ended the controversy over hours of labor laws. The
Supreme Court has followed its own precedents, 12 with the New
York Court of Appeals, apparently convinced of the constitutionality
of such statutes,' 25 expressly overruling its former decision in
People v. Willians, 26  Other States have indicated no reluctance
to follow these decisions 2 7 with the result that it is safe to say that
"18 State v. Newman Lumber Co., supra 267-268.1l9See State v. Somerville, 122 Pac. 324, 325-326 (1912).
120State v. Bunting, 71 Or. 259, 139 Pac. 731 (x914).
'
21 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 6i L. Ed. 830, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (gi6).
-
22The act provided for a ten hour day, but allowed three hours overtime
each day at one and one half pay.
123Commonwealth v. Boston & M. R. R., 222 Mass. 2o6, iiO N.E. 264
(1915).
124Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 265, 63 L. Ed. 597, 39 Sup. Ct.
273 (i919) ; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. Ed. 69o, 44 Sup. Ct.
325 (1923).
125People v. Schweinler Press, 214.N. Y. 395, io8 N.E. 639 (915), fol-
lowed in People v. Warden of the City Prison, 2,5 N. Y. 701, io9 N.E. 1o88
(,915).
1-26189 N. Y. 131, 8I N.E. 778.
127Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 17 Arizona 267, 151 Pac. 958 (,9,5);
Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 Pac. 595 (igig), pro-
hibiting the employment of females for more than five hours consecutively
without allowing a half hour rest period; State v. Collins, 47 S. Dak. 325,
ip9 N.W. 557 (1923).
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the validity of such legislation is now removed from the slightest
doubt.
b. Hours of Labor on Public Works
In I89O the California court declared unconstitutional an ordin-
ance of the city of Los Angeles which prohibited a contractor, per-
forming work for the city, to employ laborers for more than eight
hours in one day, or to employ Chinese labor.1 28  It was, the court
said, a direct infringement of the right of such persons to make and
enforce their contracts, and was not within the police power of the
State. The movement to restrict hours of labor in private employ-
ments, it will be remembered, was at this time receiving severe
checks at the hand of the courts in spite of the decision in Holden
v. Hardy. The California case was followed in Louisiana,' 9 though
on different grounds, in Washington,'2 0 and in Illinois. 13 ' Ohio pro-
duced a similar decision 3 2 but the Kansas court in two decisions,133
upheld the State's ,power to thus restrict hours of labor on public
works on the grounds that the legislature could legitimately direct
the agents of the State to employ workers on its behalf for no longer
than the number of hours stipulated. The later Kansas case was
subsequently affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court.' . 4
The New York Court, however, which had in I9o invalidated a
minimum wage act for employes on public works on the curious
grounds that it invaded the constitutional rights of the contractor and
the constitutional rights of municipalities, 35 declared void an act
12Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, :24 Pac. 737 (809).
129State v. McNally, 48 La. Ann. 145o, 21 So. 27 (1896); a municipal
ordinance invalidated because a violation of the ordinance was made an in-
dictable offense which only the legislature had power to make.
l3OSeattle v. Smythe, 22 Wash. 327, 6o Pac. iO2 (Igoo); an ordinance
of Seattle declared invalid because it was an undue interference with liberty
of contract.
13'Fiske v. People, 188 Ill. 206, 58 N.E. 985 (igoo).
'3-°Cleveland v. Clenents Bros. etc., 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N.E. 885 (1902).
'
33Re Dalton, 61 Kan. 257, 59 Pac. 336 (igoo) ; State v. Atkdn, 64 Kan.
174, 67 Pac. 519 (1902).
'
34Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 48 L. Ed. 148, 24 Sup. Ct. 124 (1903).
135People v. Coler, i66 N. Y. I, 59 N.E. 716 (19O1). Cf. Treat v. Coler,
166 N. Y. 144, 59 N.E. 776 (igoi).
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limiting hours of labor on public works. 138  That such an act could
not be upheld as an exercise of the police power, the court considered
a "proposition too plain for debate."' 1 7 The police power was
sufficient to include regulation of hours for women and children, as
in Commonwealth v. Hamilton, and for male adults in dangerous
occupations, as in Holden v. Hardy, but the class of laborers in
the present act was selected by a classification which had no reason-
able relation to public health. The act was equally invalid on the
ground that the legislature might impose such restrictions as it saw
fit upon the manner in which work should be done for the public, be-
cause the laborers affected by the act were not working for the State,
nor for the public, but for the contractor who was directly respon-
sible for their conduct, although the Supreme Court of the United
States in upholding the Kansas act, had expressly rested the decision
on the grounds that the employes were working for the State.3 8 In
19o4 the New York court successfully distinguished the Atkins case,
and again invalidated an hours of labor on public works statute, in
its solicitude to protect the constitutional rights of cities.3 9 It was
not until a constitutional amendment in 19o8 that the effect of these
decisions was avoided.14  The court, however, was stubborn, and
continued to deny that such power was vested in the legislature by
virtue of its police power,'' but only because the people of the State
had commanded that the Freedom of contract formerly enjoyed
must yield to this extent. 42
For the most part, since- the Atkins case, such statutes are gen-
erally regarded as valid, and have been so held in Washington, 4 3
13GPeople v. Orange Co. Road Construction Co., 175 N. Y. 84, 67 N.E.
129 (2903).
33767 N.E. 129.
138X9I U. S. 207, 224.
'
39People v. Grout, 179 N. Y. 417, 72 N.E. 464 (19o4).
140Art. 12, sec. i.
1
41See People v. Metz, 193 N. Y. 148, 85 N.E. io7O (19o8).
'42Ibid, 158. And an act which limited hours of labor to eight hours in
printing shops doing work for the State was declared unconstitutional when
it appeared that work was also done for others. People v. Zinnerman, 58
Misc. 264, xo9 N. Y. S. 396 (19o8).
243Re Broad, 36 Wash. 449, 78 Pac. lOO4 (i9o4).
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Montana, 144 Oklahoma,', and Massachusetts,' 46 and it makes little
difference whether the acts provide a forfeiture of the contract price
by the contractor violating the act, or whether they provide for im-
prisonment and fine in case of failure to comply. If the statutes are
vague in determining when the penalty should attach, they may
be unconstitutional,' 47 but aside from general requirements of due
process in this respect, there seems to be little doubt of the legisla-
tures' power to so regulate the length of time which men shall toil
on public works.
c. Hours of Labor for Children
The validity of State legislation restricting the hours which chil-
dren might labor, and prohibiting them altogether from engaging in
some occupations, has never been seriously questioned by the courts.
The principle is so consonant with the general attitude of the com-
mon law toward infants that little opposition has appeared to chal-
lenge the guardianship of the State in this respect. The New York
court, in 1894, upheld, as within the police power, an act prohibiting
the exhibition of any female child under fourteen, in theatrical per-
formances, dances, or any exhibitions dangerous to life, limb, health
or morals of children. 148  The court laid down as the basis for the
decision that "it is not, and cannot be disputed that the interest that
the State has in the physical, moral and intellectual well being of
its members, warrants the implication and the exercise of every just
power, which will result in preparing the child, in future life, to
support itself, to serve the State and in all the relations and duties
144State v. Livingston Concrete Building etc. Co., 34 Mont. 57o, 87 Pac.
98o (i9o6).
45Byars v. State, 2 Okla. Cr. 481, 1o2 Pac. 804 (igog).
'46Opinion of the Justices, 208 Mass. 6ig, 94 N.E. io44 (I9ii). So also
in Texas, Bradford v. State, 78 Tex. Cr. 285, io8 S.W. 702 (1915) ; in Oregon
Ex parte Steiner, 68 Or. 218, 137 Pac. 204 (1913) ; and in Maryland, Sweeten
v. State, 122 Md. 634, 90 Ati. i8o (i915).
147State v. Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387, 240 Pac. 208 (1925). It is constitu-
tional for a State to provide that only citizens can be employed on public
works, and that local citizens be given preference. Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S.
175, 6o L. Ed. 2o6, 36 Sup. Ct. 78 (1915) ; Lee v. Lynn, 223 Mass. io9, iii
N.E. 700 (1916). But see the earlier case, Chicago v. Hulbert, 215 Ill. 346,
68 N.E. 786 (igoi).
U4sPeople v. Ewer, 141 N. Y. i29, 36 N.E. 4 (1894).
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of adult life to perform well and capably its part."'4 9 In Oregon,
some few years later, it was declared that the State might exercise
unlimited control.'50 Speaking of children, the court said, "They are
wards of the State and subject to its control. As to them the State
stands in the position of parens patriae, and may exercise unlimited
supervision and control over their contracts, occupations and conduct
and the liberty and right of those who assume to deal with them.
This is a power which inheres in government for its own preserva-
tion and for the protection of the life, person and health and morals
of its future citizens."' 5'3
Courts in other States have taken similar positions, 5 2 the United
States Supreme Court upholding an Illinois act with a provision
that employers were required, at their peril, to ascertain that those
employed by them were in fact above the age specified. 5 3 The
court quickly disposed of the latter clause by declaring that "as it
was competent for the State in securing the safety of the young to
prohibit such employment altogether, it could select the means ap-
propriate to make its prohibition effective. . .154 In view of the
inability of Congress to regulate in behalf of children, as to em-
ployment and hours of labor, either under the commerce clause 55
or under the taxing power,5 6 both State and Federal courts of last
3-491bid, 133.
I 0 See State v. Shorey, 48 Or. 396, 86 Pac. 88I (i9o6).
15186 Pac. 881, 882.
'52Collett v. Scott, 3o Pa. Super. 430 (i9o6); Re Weber, i49 Cal. 392,
87 Pac. 280 (i9o6) ; Re Spencer, 149 Cal. 396, 86 Pac. 896 (1906) ; Lenahan
v. Pittston Coal Co., 218 Pa. 3H, 67 Atl. 642 (1907); Bryant v. Skellman
Hardware Co., 76 N. J. L. 45, 69 Atl. 23 (19o8) ; Starnes v. Albion Manu-
facturing Co., 147 N. C. 356, 61 S.E. 525 (19o8) ; Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak,
172 Ind. 423, 87 N.E. =9 (1907) ; Terry Davy Co. v. Nally, 146 Ark. 448,
225 S.W. 887 (192o) ; Kendall v. State, 113 Ohio St. ii, 148 N.E. 367 (1925).
'53Sturgess v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 58 L. Ed. 245, 34 Sup. Ct. 6o
(1913).
154Ibid, 325.
155Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 38 Sup. Ct. 529
(i918).
15 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 2o, 66 L. Ed. 817, 42 Sup.
Ct. 449 (x92). A more liberal attitude toward acts of Congress might have
produced a different result. Cf. United States v. McCray, 195 U. S. 27, 49
L. Ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. 769 (904). One other possibility for Federal control,
aside from constitutional amendment, may remain, namely the treaty madng
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resort are apparently not disposed to question the power of State
legislatures to so regulate. The infringement of liberty of contract
is, in theory, little endangered, inasmuch as minors do not have un-
limited capacity to contract, and consequently such further restric-
tions as the State may impose, in its solicitude as parens patriae in
safe-guarding the public interest in the welfare of children, are
seldom brought in issue.
d. Labor on Sunday
Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts
had occasion to pass upon the validity of labor legislation. In 1858
the California court invalidated an act "for the better observance
of the Sabbath," declaring that the legislature had no more right
to forbid or enjoin the lawful pursuit of a lawful occupation on
one day of the week, any more than it could forbid it altogether.'5 7
Three years later, however, the court sustained an act of this nature
"purely as a civil regulation," on the grounds that it spent its whole
force upon "matters of civil economy, and was not designated to
subserve any religious purpose."' 8" To provide for one day of
compulsory rest "for the welfare of the general society," the court
thought, was not beyond the scope of the power of the legislature.
The Supreme Court settled the question, in general, in Soon
Hing z. Crowley,'59 in 1884, by upholding an ordinance of San
Francisco prohibiting work in laundries on Sunday because of the
right of the government to "protect all persons from the physical
power. That Congress may, in pursuance of treaty provisions, accomplish
what it would otherwise have no power to effect is established. See Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 64 L. Ed. 641, 4o Sup. Ct. 382 (1920). It is subject
for speculation whether, if child labor could fairly be regarded as a matter
of international concern, a valid treaty might not enable Congress to control
child labor in the States. Cf. the language of Mr. Justice Field in Gorfry
v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 266, 33 L. Ed. 642, 10 Sup. Ct. 295 (189o), and cases
cited. See also Corwin, National Supremacy, 291-295, and Burr, Treaty-
Making Power of the United States and the Methods of its Enforcement as
Affecting the Police Powers of the States, 327 (1912).
157Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (1858).
15 8Ex parte Andrews, i8 Cal. 679 (1861). See also Ex parte Wester-
field, 55 Cal. 550 (188o).
59II3 U. S. 703, 28 L. Ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. 730 (1883).
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and moral debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor."'6
In general, Sunday statutes have been upheld by State courts, even
when they were confined "to specific kinds of labor.161  txcepting
certain kinds of labor in the statute, has not seemed to bother the
courts.6 2 There have been, however, some courts who have feared
lest freedom of contract and property rights were being infringed.1 3
The police power has usually and latterly been found sufficient to
authorize such infringement, 6 4 for the courts have felt that they
were unable to say that one day of rest in seven was so extravagant
and unreasonable and so disconnected with the probable promotion
of health and welfare that its compulsion in law was beyond the
power of the legislature. 6 5
(To Bl CONTINUED)
160Ibid, 710.
26'People v. Havnor, i49 N. Y. 195, 43 N.E. 541 (1896) ; People v. Power
Co., 86 Misc. 6i, 149 N. Y. S. 45 (1914); People v. Doyle, 164 App. Div.
795, 15o N. Y. S. 341 (1914); Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N.E. 1071
(1911).
'
6 2Carr v. State, supra. In Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164, 44 L. Ed.
716, 20 Sup. Ct. 666 (i9oo), a statute was upheld which exempted works of
necessity and charity, including whatever was needed for the good order,
health, and comfort of the community, but specifically stipulating that barber
shops were neither necessary or charitable. The Supreme Court found noth-
ing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent the legislature of Min-
nesota from declaring, as a matter of law, that barbering was neither neces-
sary nor charitable, but leaving other kinds of labor as matters of fact.
:
6 3State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 561, 125 S.W. 507 (1909).
26 4 People v. I-inek Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121, io8 N.E. 278 (1915);
Perky Bros. v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 713, 114 S.E. 764 (1922).
'
65 But one day of rest in seven laws will be scrutinized closely as to the
classes to which they apply, and if the specified or excluded employments do
not appear to rest upon a reasonable basis for classification, the same will be
unconstitutional. See State v. Pocoek, 161 Minn. 376, 2Ol N.W. 6io (1925).
